Determination of Federal Jurisdictional Amount in Suits on Unliquidated Claims by Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 64 Issue 5 
1966 
Determination of Federal Jurisdictional Amount in Suits on 
Unliquidated Claims 
Michigan Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Courts Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michigan Law Review, Determination of Federal Jurisdictional Amount in Suits on Unliquidated Claims, 64 
MICH. L. REV. 930 (1966). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol64/iss5/10 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
930 Michigan Law Review 
Determination of Federal Jurisdictional Amount 
in Suits on Unliquidated Claims 
[Vol. 64 
Hoping to keep federal court dockets free of petty claims and 
thereby to reduce the delay in bringing to trial controversies in-
volving more substantial sums, Congress has given United States 
district courts jurisdiction of many civil actions arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States and most disputes 
between parties of diverse citizenship only when the alleged right 
forming the basis of a claimant's cause of action can be valued at 
more than ten thousand dollars.1 The value of a particular claim is 
determined by reference to those portions of its proponent's plead-
. I. 28 U.S.C. §§ 188l(a), 1332(a) (1964). These provisions refer to the value of the 
claimant's right as "the amount in controversy." For a discussion of the application of 
this legislation in special situations, see IA BARRON 8c HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE 8e 
PROCEDURE § 392 (Rules ed. 1960) (counterclaims and crossclaims); 2 id. §§ 508, 534, 569 
(1961) Goinder of claims and parties). 
Federal law provides different jurisdictional provisions for particular classes of cases 
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1333-40, 1343-45, 1346(b), 1347-48, 1350-51, 1353-58 (1964). At present the largest cate• 
gories of suits governed by § 1331(a) are actions arising under the Jones Act and suits 
challenging the constitutionality of state legislation. See S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong,, 
2d Sess. 5 (1958). The jurisdictional minimum in an interpleader action brought in a 
federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship is $500. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1964), 
"The jurisdictional amount should not be so high as to convert the Federal courts 
into courts of big business nor so low as to fritter a,vay their time in the trial of petty 
controversies." S. REP. No. 1880, op. cit. supra, at 3. 
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ing which tend to support his prayer for relief.2 Ne~ther the exis-
tence of a valid defense to the claim, even if it is obvious from the 
face of the proponent's own pleading, nor an ultimate recovery of 
less than ten thousand dollars has any significance in testing a court's 
jurisdiction. 3 
When an opponent or the court sua sponte questions the 
validity of a' claimant's assertion that the right which he seeks to 
enforce has a value exceeding ten thousand dollars, the claimant 
must establish the truth of his assertion.4 The statements in his 
pleading are not necessarily helpful, for they satisfy the specificity 
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if they merely 
allege facts sufficient to indicate the general nature of the events 
supposedly giving rise to a right of recovery.5 Moreover, the assertion 
of the presence of the jurisdictional amount itself need be nothing 
more than a sentence to the effect that the amount in controversy 
exceeds ten thousand dollars.6 Nevertheless, it is generally assumed, 
on the basis of the rule enunciated by the United States Supreme 
Court in Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co.,1 that a 
claimant's allegation of the presence of the jurisdictional amount 
should be conclusive unless (I) it appears not to have been made in 
good faith or (2) the court believes as a matter of legal certainty that 
the value of the right in controversy is in fact ten thousand dollars 
or less. 
2. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938). See 
generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 33 (1963). 
3. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., supra note 2, at 289. See generally 
1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ,r 0.92[1] (2d ed. 1964); WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 2, § 33. 
But see Unique Balance Co. v. De Vri_es, 166 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Cal. 1958). 
4. See Wade v. Rogala, 270 F.2d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 1959); Kantor v. Comet Press Books 
Corp., 187 F. Supp. 321, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b), (h)(2); WRIGHT, op. 
cit. supra note 2, § 33. 
The court has discretion in determining the mode of proof. See Gibbs v. Buck, 307 
U.S. 66, 71-72 (1939); Wade v. Rogala, supra, at 285; Kantor v. Comet Press Books Corp., 
supra, at 322; I MooRE, op. cit. supra note 3, ,r 0.92[4]. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d) provides that jurisdictional issues "shall be .•. determined 
before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that the •.• determina-
tion thereof be deferred until the trial.'' 
5. "A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, coun-
terclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, shall contain ••• (2) a short and plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief .... " FED. R. Crv. P. 
8(a)(2). See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); 2 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 3, 
,r 8.03. FED. R. Crv. P. 9(g) provides: "Where items of special damage are claimed, they 
shall be specifically stated.'' This rule is designed to prevent an adversary from being 
surprised at the nature of the injuries for which relief is sought. Therefore, only a 
general statement of the types of injuries allegedly sustained is necessary to satisfy the 
requirements of the rule. Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Brown, 307 F.2d 306, 308 (5th Cir. 
1962); 2 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 3, ,r 9.08. Indeed, no greater factual detail is 
required in pleading special damages than in pleading ordinary damages. See Fm. R. 
CIV. P. Form 9. · 
6. See FED. R. CIV. P. Form 2. 
7. 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938). 
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There may be relatively little difficulty in determining whether 
claims for liquidated damages-fixed amounts or amounts that can be 
fixed with a few simple calculations8-meet the jurisdictional require-
ment as interpreted in the light of the St. Paul doctrine. This could 
be true, for example, when suit is brought to recover lost salary or 
the proceeds of an insurance policy.9 Comparatively easy disposition 
can likewise be made of those types of claims which are considered 
incapable of pecuniary valuation and therefore not justiciable in a 
federal court when jurisdiction is predicated solely upon a statute 
containing a minimum amount-in-controversy provision.10 Evaluat-
ing a cause of action becomes more troublesome, however, when 
its proponent demands unliquidated damages,11 such as compen-
sation for pain and suffering, mental anguish, inconvenience, or 
humiliation, or when he requests punitive damages and the applica-
ble substantive law does not clearly prohibit their recovery.12 
When confronted with such unliquidated or punitive damage 
claims, some courts stress the "good faith" aspect of the St. Paul 
rule. It is apparently the absence of clear guidelines for establishing 
\ 
8. "Liquidated damages 'mean damages, agreed upon as to amount by the parties, 
or fixed by operation of law, or under the correct applicable principles of law made 
certain in amount by the terms of the contract, or susceptible of being made certain in 
amount by mathematical calculations from factors which are or ought to be in the 
possession or knowledge of the party to be charged.'" Nonvood Morris Plan Co. V, 
McCarthy, 295 Mass. 597, 602, 4 N.E.2d 450, 454 (1936), quoting from Cochrane v. 
Forbes, 267 Mass. 417, 420, 166 N.E. 752, 753 (1929). 
9. Air Line Dispatchers Ass'n v. California E. Ainvays, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 521 (N.D. 
Cal. 1954) (where only damages sought are for lost earnings stemming from employee's 
wrongful discharge, amount in controversy equals amount of former salary lost minus 
amount of compensation received from an employer other than defendant since dis-
charge); Nikora v. Mayer, 122 F. Supp. 587 (D. Conn. 1954) (in suit for specific perfor-
mance of land contract, value of real property which is subject matter of contract is 
amount in controversy); New Century Cas. Co. v. Chase, 39 F. Supp. 768 (S.D.W. Va. 
1941) (in suit on insurance policy, maximum liability on policy is amount in con-
troversy). 
10. Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487 (1885) (habeas corpus proceeding): Davenport v. 
Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1957) (suit to compel specific per-
formance of an arbitration contract); United States ex rel. Curtiss v. Haviland, 297 Fed. 
431 (2d Cir. 1924) (lunacy inquisition); McGuire v. Amrein, 101 F. Supp. 414 (D. Md. 
1951) (suit to prohibit divulgence of contents of intercepted telephone message): Whit-
ney v. American Shipbuilding Co., 197 Fed. 777 (N.D. Ohio 1911) (stockholder's action 
to compel a corporation to allow him to inspect its books and records): Bowman v. 
Bowman, 30 Fed. 849 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1887) (divorce action). 
11. "Unliquidated damages are such as rest in opinion only, and which cannot be 
ascertained by computation or calculation.'' Litsinger v. Ross, l!i5 M:d • ,;4, 157, 44 A,2d 
435, 436 (1945). 
12. In some kinds of actions applicable law prohibits an award of punitive damages • 
under any circumstances. In such situations a demand for exemplary damages can be 
discounted completely as legally impossible of fulfillment. See, e.g., Deming v. Buckley's 
Art Gallery, 196 F. Supp. 246 (W.D. Ark. 1961) (punitive damages not recoverable in 
breach of contract action); Kantor v. Comet Pres$ Books Corp., 187 F. Supp. 821 
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) (punitive damages not recoverable for "fraud arising out of publishing 
contract''); Newcastle Prods., Inc. v. School Dist. of Blair Township, 18 F. Supp. 835 
(W .D. Pa. 1936) (punitive damages not recoverable from municipal corporation). 
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a claimant's good faith that leads to the lack of uniformity in the 
methods employed in determining the question of sincerity and 
also, no doubt, to the inconsistency in the results reached. For ex-
ample, in Harris v. Pasquotank County,13 where the defendant 
challenged the validity of the plaintiff's allegation that the amount 
in controversy in a breach of contract action met the jurisdictional 
minimum, the court held that the latter's affidavit asserting his honest 
belief that he was entitled to more than ten thousand dollars damages 
was sufficient by itself to satisfy the good faith requirement. The 
court in Gordon v. Daigle,14 on the other hand, was unwilling to rely 
only upon the claimants' affidavits. It conducted a pre-trial hearing 
and received evidence on such matters as the length of time during 
which the plaintiffs were unable to work and the nature of their 
disabilities before deciding that each claimant lacked good faith in 
seeking damages in excess of ten thousand dollars for whiplash 
injuries suffered in an automobile accident. 
· Courts have shown a similar lack of uniformity in applying the 
"legal certainty" aspect of the St. Paul rule.· Wade v. Rogala15 ex-
emplifies one approach. Plaintiff sued under the Jones Act16 as the 
administratrix of the estate of a seaman whose death was allegedly 
attributable to defendant's negligence, which was said to have re-
sulted in the sinking of the vessel on which the decedent had been 
working. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that 
there was no justification for the lower court's method of determin-
ing before trial that plaintiff could not produce sufficient evidence 
to support a verdict in excess of the jurisdictional minimum or that 
such a verdict, if rendered, would have to be set aside as a matter 
of law. Although it apparently approved of a judge's looking at 
some evidence before trial in an effort to test the validity of a 
claimant's allegation regarding the amount in controversy, the court 
felt that where "the issue of jurisdictional amount ... is so closely 
tied to the merits of the cause ... ,"17 the court should not insist 
upon the pre-trial production of so much evidence that "under the 
guise of determining jurisdiction, the merits of the controversy 
[are] .. _ summarily decided ... .''18 The court in Anthony v. United 
Ins. Co. of America,19 however, took a different position on the issue 
of pre-trial examination of the amount in controversy. Defendant's 
agent had sold a thousand-dollar life insurance policy to the insured 
____ <\_I~---------------------
13. 227 F. Supp. 625 (E.D.N.C. 1964). 
14. 230 F. Supp. 819 (W.D. La. 1964). 
15. 270 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1959). 
16. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964). 
17. Wade v. Rogala, 270 F.2d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 1959). 
18. Ibid.; accord, Diana v. Canada Dry Corp., 189 F. Supp. 280 (W .D. Pa. 1960); see 
Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886). 
19. 240 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.s.c. 1965). 
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on the basis of misrepresentations to her that she was an acceptable 
risk despite her bad health. After her death, defendant maintained 
that it was not bound by its agent's statements and that it was there-
fore not obligated on the policy. The beneficiary sued to recover 
fifty thousand dollars actual and punitive damages in reliance upon 
state law, which would have permitted an award of exemplary 
damages. Dismissing the complaint for want of jurisdiction, the 
court, apparently unconcerned about looking at all the facts tending 
to support the plaintiff's recovery, held that "under, the facts in this 
case" a jury verdict in excess of ten thousand dollars would not be 
permitted to stand as a matter of law. 
When a court, after reviewing evidence introduced to sub-
stantiate the validity of an allegation that a claim can support an 
award of more than ten thousand dollars, rules that recovery in 
excess of this figure is impossible, it could be influenced by two 
fundamentally different considerations. On the one hand, it might 
simply feel that no jury would return a verdict larger than the 
jurisdictional minimum on the basis of the claimant's evidence. In 
such a case, the court would be resting its decision on a factual deter-
,mination rather than a legal certainty. In attempting to evaluate 
the evidence as it assumed a jury would, rather than attempting to 
determine the maximum permissible verdict a jury could reach, 
the court would have misconceived the relationship between judge 
and jury, since it is not the judge's responsibility to decide what a 
jury will do.20 On the other hand, the court might believe that if a 
jury returned a verdict in excess of the jurisdictional minimum on 
the basis of the evidence, the result could not be allowed to stand.21 
Here the St. Paul rule is properly applied, and the fear expressed in 
Wade that an extensive examination of a claimant's evidence would 
impinge upon the jury's role is not well founded, for the court has 
sought to determine the largest recovery which the evidence can 
support as a matter of law, rather than the size of the award to which 
it will actually lead.22 Indeed, it would seem that the only fair way 
for a court to determine the largest amount to which a claimant 
could legally be entitled is to consider all his evidence on the damage 
issue. · 
As noted above, Congress established the jurisdictional minimum 
20. Smithers v. Smith, 204 U.S. 632, 645-46 (1907); Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 
565 (1886). 
21. See Turner v. Wilson Line, 242 F.2d 414, 419 (1st Cir. 1957); Anthony v. United 
Ins. Co. of America, 240 F. Supp. 95, 96 (E.D.S.C. 1965). But see Bell v. Preferred Life 
Assur. Soc'y, 320 U.S. 238, 243 (1943). 
22. "The controlling distinction between the power of the court and that of the 
jury is that the former is the power to determine the law and the latter to determine 
the facts." Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935); accord, Hickman v. Jones, 76 
U.S. (9 Wall.) 197, 201 (1869); Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall,) 1, 4 (1794). 
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in an effort to reduce the caseload of the federal courts. However, 
no rules were provided by which a court can determine whether 
the proper amount is actually in controversy in a given case.23 In 
St. Paul the Supreme Court attempted to correct this deficiency by 
holding that a claimant's allegation respecting the value of the right 
which he seeks to assert should control if the "good faith" and "legal 
certainty" criteria are satisfied, but it has never defined the stan-
dards by which these tests are to be applied. No standard is actually 
needed for the application of the "good faith" aspect of the St. Paul 
rule, because that criterion has little significance without reference 
to the amount legally recoverable. If it is legally certain that recov-
ery in excess of the jurisdictional minimum is impossible, the claim-
ant's good faith belief that he is entitled to more than ten thousand 
dollars is irrelevant.24 Conversely, if there is no such legal certainty, 
it is unlikely that bad faith would be found 1vhen a claimant has a 
legal right to recover the amount sought. 25 In failing to lay down 
standards for determining which recoveries are legally impossible, 
the Court no doubt assumed that judges would use the same guide-
lines which they regularly employ in setting aside excessive verdicts 
and in ordering remittiturs--other situations in which it is crucial 
to determine the maximum amount of a legally permissible verdict. 
In unliquidated damage suits, courts generally allow a jury· award 
to stand unmodified unless it is "grossly excessive,"26 "flagrantly 
outrageous and extravagant,"27 or "so high as to shock the con-
science."28 However, these standards obviously provide no basis for 
23. The only legislation dealing specifically with the determination of the amount 
in controversy is 28 U.S.C. § 2108 (1964): "Where the power of any court of appeals to 
review a case depends upon the amount or value in controversy, such amount or value, 
if not otherwise satisfactorily disclosed upon the record, may be shown and ascertained 
by the oath of a party to the case or by other competent evidence." This legislation 
appears to have been enacted during the period when a particular amount in con-
troversy was a prerequisite to appeal to a federal court of appeals from certain terri-
torial courts. Its value today is doubtful. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-92 (1964). Even accepting 
§ 2108 as an indication of congressional feeling on the question of methods to be 
employed in determining the amount in controversy, it provides no clearer guidelines 
than those currently in use in the district courts. 
24. See McDonald v. Patton, 240 F.2d 424, 426 (4th Cir. 1957). 
25. But see Brown v. Bodak, 188 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Plaintiff filed a com-
plaint seeking $8,500 damages for personal injuries at a time when the jurisdictional 
minimum was only $3,000. The jurisdictional minimum was raised to $10,000 before 
trial, however, and the court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. Thereupon 
plaintiff amended to claim $10,500 but alleged no additional elements of damage. The 
court felt that the amendment was colored, for the purpose of attempting to establish 
federal jurisdiction. Without determining whether a recovery in excess of $10,000 would 
have been legally permissible, the court dismissed the action because of plaintiff's bad 
faith in alleging the amount in controversy. 
26. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Morris, 260 F.2d 594, 506 (6th Cir. 1958). 
27. Mooney v. Henderson Portion Pack Co., 339 F.2d 64, 65 (6th Cir. 1964). 
28. Denny v. Montour R.R., 101 F. Supp. 735, 743 (W.D. Pa. 1951). 
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anything approaching an objective determination and must be 
partly responsible for the inconsistency in the results achieved in 
applying the jurisdictional limitations.29 
It is probably impossible to formulate objective guidelines for 
determining whether the ten thousand dollar minimum is present 
in a particular action for unliquidated damages, so long as the St. 
Paul rule remains law.30 Therefore, any attempt to create a greater 
degree of consistency in the results of hearings on the jurisdictional 
issue in the course of such suits must come from a more uniform 
method for employing the St. Paul tests when a pre-trial attack is 
made upon a claimant's jurisdictional-amount allegation. Any pro-
cedure adopted should be predicated upon three considerations. 
First, since a claimant's sincerity cannot be determined without 
reference to the amount which he can legally recover, an indepen-
dent examination into his good faith is generally futile.81 Second, a 
court cannot with fairness dismiss a claimant's action on the ground 
of lack of the requisite amount in controversy without taking ac-
count of all his evidence bearing on the damage issue. Third, in 
deference to Congress' desire to expedite the conduct of business 
in the federal courts, these tribunals must strive to consider this 
evidence with all reasonable dispatch.32 
One approach would be to allow a claimant of unliquidated 
damages whose allegation of the amount in controversy has been 
challenged to file an affidavit with the court specifying with par-
29. Compare Jenkins v. Fandal, 242 F. Supp. 528 (W.D. Pa. 1965), with Mintz v. 
DeBiase, 236 F. Supp. 654 (D. Mass. 1964). In the former case plaintiff claimed damages 
for pain, suffering, inconvenience and loss of future earnings on account of back in• 
juries alleged to have been sustained in an automobile accident resulting from defen• 
dant's negligence. Although plaintiff maintained that she had experienced discomfort 
immediately after the accident, she waited three weeks to consult a physician. She pro-
duced little evidence to show that the mishap had diminished her earning power. 
Eventually the jury awarded her only $2,000. Although the court recognized that the 
validity of an allegation of the amount in controversy can be made at any time, it denied 
a post-trial motion to dismiss her complaint, holding that the complaint did not clearly 
lack a valid allegation of jurisdictional amount. In the latter case plaintiff sought com• 
pensation for pain, suffering, ·shock, sickness, and continuing discomfort from injuries 
said to have been sustained when she was thrown from defendant's horse. The court 
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim which could be valued at $10,000 or 
more, despite the fact that the plaintiff had been hospitalized for three weeks, in casts 
and incapacitated for two months, in braces for an additional six weeks, and allegedly 
suffered continued pain and discomfort. 
30. While St. Paul is generally recognized as the leading decision dealing with the 
interpretation of the jurisdictional amount provisions in the Judicial Code, it must be 
noted that the case appears to have involved a claim for liquidated damages-the out-
of-pocket expenses incurred because of defendant insurer's alleged breach of contract in 
denying liability upon certain workmen's compensation claims asserted against plaintiff 
employer. Since St. Paul did not expressly address itself to the special problems involved 
in determining the amount in controversy in suits for unliquidated damages, doubt 
has been cast upon the need to consider it binding in this area. See Barry v. Edmunds, 
116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886). 
31. See text accompanying notes 22 8: 23 supra. 
32. See note 1 supra and accompanying text. 
March 1966] Notes 937 
ticularity the nature of the injuries he has allegedly sustained and 
the evidence upon which he will rely to prove his damages. The court 
could examine this affidavit alone, without considering the actual 
evidence, in much the same manner as it would deal with the affi-
davits and depositions filed in connection with a motion for sum-
mary judgment. Upon the basis of the sworn allegations it could 
apply what legal certainty standards there are to determine whether 
a claimant could legally recover more than ten thousand dollars. 
The time and the expense necessary to pr-0duce the actual evidence 
bearing on the damage issue would thus be saved, and the claimant 
would be afforded an opportunity to state his entire case in favor of 
the court's taking jurisdiction of his cause of action. 
If a court should find during the course of trial that the state-
ments in a claimant's affidavit were exaggerated, it could invoke the 
sanction provided by Congress in the 1958 amendments to the Judi-
cial Code. These provisions authorize courts to deny costs to a claim-
ant, or to assess costs against him, if he ultimately recovers less than 
ten thousand dollars .in any action in which federal jurisdiction has 
been predicated upon an amount in controversy in excess of that 
figure.83 Indeed, these amendments suggest that Congress foresaw 
cases in which a court could not confidently decide before trial 
whether there was an appropriate amount in controversy and that it 
approved a court's taking jurisdiction Jn such cases.84 Moreover, since 
this legislation was designed to deter the filing of "inflated" claims it 
was not necessarily intended to be applied in every case in which 
less than ten thousand dollars is recovered, despite the claimant's· 
good faith in asking for more than ten thousand dollars.85 The threat 
33. 28 U.S.C. § 133l(b) (1964) provides in reference to claims arising under the Con-
stitution, laws, or treaties of the United States: "Except when express provision therefor 
is otherwise made in a statute of the United States, where the plaintiff is finally ad• 
judged to be entitled to recover less than the sum or value of $10,000, computed with-
out regard to any setoff or counterclaim tci which the defendant may be adjudged to 
be entitled, and exclusive of interests and costs, the district court may deny costs to the 
plaintiff and, in addition, may impose costs on the plaintiff." 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(b) (1964), dealing with suits brought in federal courts because of 
the diverse citizenship of the parties, contains language virtually identical to that of 
§ 133l(b), but applies only to "the plaintiff who files the case originally in the Federal 
courts •••• " It appears that these words were omitted from § 1331(b) through over-
sight. See 58 CoLuM. L. REv. 1291 n.31 (1958). 
34. Lutz v. McNair, 233 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Va. 1964). 
35. The claimant who acted in good faith in demanding more than $10,000 need 
not fear the costs provisions, since a court is not required to assess costs, even though 
ultimate recovery is less than that amount. Stachon v. Hoxie, 190 F. Supp. 185 (W.D. 
Mich. 1960); see S. REP. No. 1830, op. cit. supra note I, at 5. · 
It has been argued that the continued application of the good-faith test in determin-
ing the validity of a claimant's allegation of the amount in controversy would render 
the costs provisions virtually meaningless, since a claim found to be in bad faith is 
likely to be dismissed, and, where it is not dismissed, it seems difficult to say that a 
court can find a claimant in good faith for the purpose of taking jurisdiction but in 
bad faith for the purpose of applying the costs provisions, where the same test of good 
faith is involved in both determinations. Foster, Congress Changes Jurisdiction of 
United States District Courts, Wis. B. Bull., August 1958, p. 73; Comment, 58 CoLUM. 
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of these costs provisions--or, if Congress so desires, more serious 
penalties38-should make a claimant consider the contents of his 
affidavit carefully. Not to be overlooked in this regard is the possi-
bility of a contempt citation when a claimant can be shown to have 
falsified his affidavit.37 
Since the final determination of the amount in controversy 
would rest in the judge's subjective evaluation of the claimant's 
affidavit considered against the background of the imperfect stan-
dards currently available for applying the St. Paul test, the above 
proposal will not serve as a panacea for the difficulty involved in 
an attempt to determine accurately the value of the rights in con-
troversy in unliquidated damage actions. Nevertheless, the estab-
lishment of a uniform method for dealing with the problem will 
increase the likelihood of achieving consistency and predictability 
in the results of pretrial hearings on this jurisdictional question. A 
court's adoption of the proposal would serve to implement the con-
gressional policy of limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts and 
thereby expediting the conduct of their business, and at the same 
time would give the claimant a better opportunity than he has 
at present in some courts to indicate in detail the nature of all 
his evidence relating to the amount put into controversy by his 
complaint. 
L REv. 1287, 1291-94 (1958); Note, 45 MARQ. L. REv. 117, 119 (1961); see Stachon v. 
Hoxie, supra. See generally Cowen, Federal Jurisdiction Amended, 44 VA. L REV, 9'11, 
975-78 (1958). 
36. See ALI, STUDY OF THE DlVISION OF JURISDicrION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL 
COURTS 49 (I'cnt. Draft No. I, 1963), where it was suggested that the deterrent value 
of the costs provisions could be enhanced if a court were permitted to tax against a 
party who filed an inflated claim the amount of his opponent's reasonable expenses 
and attorney's fees attributable to the conduct of his defense. Similar assessments arc 
currently permissible against a party who has abused the federal pretrial discovery 
procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d), 37(a), 37(c). The proposal docs not appear among 
the American Law Institute's final recommendations dealing with the diversity juris• 
diction of federal courts. See ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN 
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 64-65 (Official Draft 1965). 
37. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 56(g), which provides for contempt penalties when a 
party files in bad faith a motion for summary judgment. 
